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Abstract
I argue that conventional estimates of the criterion for classical
behavior of a macroscopic body are incorrect, because they do not
take into account the locality of interactions, which characterizes the
behavior of all systems described approximately by local quantum
field theory. Black holes are the only localized objects which do not
have such a description. The deviations from classical behavior of a
macroscopic body, except for those which can be described as clas-
sical uncertainties in the initial values of macroscopic variables,are
exponentially small as a function of the volume of the macro-system
in microscopic units.
1 Classical behavior in the non-relativistic quan-
tum mechanics of particles
In standard texts on non-relativistic quantum mechanics the classical limit
is described via examples and via the WKB approximation. In particular,
one often describes the spreading of the wave packet of a free particle, and
estimates it as a function of time and the particle mass M . There is nothing
wrong with the mathematics done in these texts, but the implication that
these estimates provide the basis for an understanding of why classical me-
chanics is such a good approximation for macroscopic objects is not correct
and therefore misleading. In particular it leads one to conclude that the
corrections to decoherence for a wave function describing a superposition of
two different macroscopic states is power law in the mass. I would aver that
this mistake forms part of the psychological unease that many physicists feel
about the resolution of Schro¨dinger’s cat paradox in terms of the concept of
decoherence.
In this introductory section, I would like to demonstrate why such esti-
mates are wrong, using standard ideas of non-relativistic quantum mechanics.
In the remainder of the paper I will discuss the basis for these calculations in
quantum field theory. This will also remove the necessity to resort to Hartree-
Fock like approximations to prove the point directly in the non-relativistic
formalism. The essential point of the argument is that we must take into
account the fact that a macroscopic object is made out of a huge number
> 1020 of microscopic constituents, in order to truly understand its classical
behavior. I will argue that, as a consequence, the overlaps between states
where the object follows two macroscopically different trajectories, as well as
the matrix elements of all local1 operators between such states, are of order
e−10
20
.
The extraordinary smallness of such double exponentials defeats all of our
ordinary intuitions about ordinary physics. In a phrase I learned in grad-
uate school from Kerson Huang, “The number e10
20
, viewed as a time in-
terval, is essentially the same number when measured in Planck units, as it
is when measured in ages of the universe. The two differ by a mere factor
1In this context local means an operator which is a sum of terms, each of which operates
only on a few of the constituent particles. A more precise, field theoretic, description will
be given in the next section.
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of 1061.”. Over such long time scales, many counter-intuitive things could
happen. For example, in a hypothetical classical model of a living organ-
ism made of this many constituents, or in a correct quantum model, the
phenomenon of Poincare recurrences assures that given (roughly) this much
time,the organism could spontaneously self assemble,out of a generic initial
state of its constituents.
Consider then, the wave function of such a composite of N ≫ 1 particles,
assuming a Hamiltonian of the form
H =
∑ −→p 2i
2mi
+
∑
Vij(xi − xj).
Apart from electromagnetic and gravitational forces, the two body potentials
are assumed to be short ranged. We could also add multi-body potentials,
as long as the number of particles that interact is ≪ N2.
The Hamiltonian is Galilean invariant and we can separate it into the
kinetic energy of the center of mass, and the Hamiltonian for the body at
rest. The wave function is of the form
ψ(Xcm)Ψ(xi − xj),
which is a general function of coordinate differences. We now want to com-
pare this wave function with the internal wave function of the system when
the particle is not following a straight, constant velocity trajectory. In or-
der to do this, we introduce an external potential U({xi}). It is extremely
important that U is not simply a function of the center of mass coordinate
but a sum of terms denoting the interaction of the potential with each of the
constituents. This very natural assumption is derivable from local field the-
ory: the external potential must interact locally with “the field that creates
a particle at a point”. So we assume
U =
∑
ui(xi),
where we have allowed for the possibility, e.g. that the external field is
electrical and different constituents have different charge.
To solve the external potential problem, we write xi = Xcm + ∆i and
expand the individual potentials around the center of mass, treating the
2Or that the strength of k body interactions fall off sufficiently rapidly with k for
k > N0 ≪ N .
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remaining terms as a small perturbation. We then obtain a Hamiltonian for
the center of mass, which has a mass of order N , as well as a potential of
order N . The large N limit is then the WKB limit for the center of mass
motion. The residual Hamiltonian for the internal wave function has small
external potential terms, whose coefficients depend on the center of mass
coordinate.
The Schrodinger equation for the center of mass motion thus has solutions
which are wave functions concentrated around a classical trajectory Xcm(t) of
the center of mass, moving in the potential
∑
ui(Xcm). These wave functions
will spread with time in a way that depends on this potential. For example,
initial Gaussian wave packets for a free particle will have a width, which
behaves like
√
t/Nm for large t, where m is a microscopic mass scale. The
fact that this is only significant when t ∼ N is the conventional explanation
for the classical behavior of the center of mass variable.
In fact, this argument misses the crucial point, namely that the small
perturbation, which gives the Hamiltonian of the internal structure a time
dependence, through the appearance of Xcm(t), is not at all negligible. To
illustrate this let us imagine that the wave function at rest has the Hartree-
Fock form, an anti-symmetrized product of one body wave functions ψi(xi),
and let us characterize the external potential by a strength ǫ. As a conse-
quence of the perturbation, each one body wave function will be perturbed,
and its overlap with the original one body wave function will be less than one.
It follows that the overlap between the perturbed and unperturbed multi-body
wave functions will be of order (1−ǫ)N . This has the exponential suppression
we claimed, as long as ǫ ≫ 1
N
. It is easy to see that a similar suppression
obtains for matrix elements of few body operators. One can argue that a
similar suppression is obtained for generalized Jastrow wave functions, with
only few body correlations, but a more general and convincing argument
based on quantum field theory will be given in the next section. Here we will
follow through the consequences of this exponential suppression.
The effect is to break up the full Hilbert space of the composite object
in the external potential, into approximate super-selection sectors labeled by
macroscopically different classical trajectories Xcm(t) (microscopically differ-
ent trajectories correspond to ǫ ∼ 1
N
). Local measurements cannot detect
interference effects between states in different super-selection sectors on times
scales shorter than e10
20
(following Huang, we leave off the obviously irrele-
vant unit of time). That is to say, for all in principle purposes, a superposition
of states corresponding to different classical trajectories behaves like a classi-
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cal probability distribution for classical trajectories. The difference of course
is that in classical statistical physics one avers that in principle one could
measure the initial conditions precisely, whereas in quantum mechanics the
uncertainty is intrinsic to the formalism.
I have used the phrase in principle in two different ways in the previous
paragraph. The first use was ironic; the natural phrase that comes to mind
is for all practical purposes. I replace in practice by in principle in order to
emphasize that any conceivable experiment that could distinguish between
the classical probability distribution and the quantum predictions would have
to keep the system isolated over times inconceivably longer than the age of
the universe. In other words, it is meaningless for a physicist to consider
the two calculations different from each other. In yet another set of words;
the phrase “With enough effort, one can in principle measure the quantum
correlations in a superposition of macroscopically different states”, has the
same status as the phrase “If wishes were horses then beggars would ride”.
The second use of in principle was the conventional philosophical one:
the mathematical formalism of classical statistical mechanics contemplates
arbitrarily precise measurements, on which we superimpose a probability
distribution which we interpret to be a measure of our ignorance. In fact,
even in classical mechanics for a system whose entropy is order 1020, this
is arrant nonsense. The measurement of the precise state of such a system
would again take inconceivably longer than the age of the universe.
This comparison is useful because it emphasizes the fact that the tiny
matrix elements between super-selection sectors are due to an entropic effect.
They are small because a change in the trajectory of the center of mass
changes the state of a huge number of degrees of freedom. Indeed, in a
very rough manner, one can say that the time necessary to see quantum
interference effects between two macroscopically different states is of order
the Poincare recurrence time of the system. This is very rough, because there
is no argument that the order 1 factors in the exponent are the same, so the
actual numbers could be vastly different. The important point is that for
truly macroscopic systems both times are super-exponentially longer than
the age of the universe.
The center of mass is one of a large number of collective or thermodynamic
observables of a typical macroscopic system found in the laboratory. The
number of such variables is a measure of the number of macroscopic moving
parts of the system. As we will see, a system with a goodly supply of such
moving parts is a good measuring device. Indeed, the application of the
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foregoing remarks to the quantum measurement problem is immediate. As
von Neumann first remarked, there is absolutely no problem in arranging a
unitary transformation which maps the state
α| ↑〉 > +β| ↓〉 > ⊗|Ready >,
of a microsystem uncorrelated with the |Ready〉 state of a measuring appa-
ratus, into the correlated state
α| ↑〉 > ⊗|+〉+ β| ↓〉 > ⊗|− >,
where |+ /− > are pointer states of the measuring apparatus. If we simply
assume, in accordance with experience, that the labels +/− characterize the
value of a macroscopic observable in the sense described above, then we can
immediately come to the following conclusions
• The quantum interference between the two pieces of the wave function
cannot be measured on time scales shorter than the super-exponential
times described above. The predictions of quantum mechanics for this
state are identical in principle (first usage) to the predictions of a clas-
sical theory that tells us only the probabilities of the machine reading
+ or −. Like any such probabilistic theory the algorithm for interpret-
ing its predictions is to condition the future predictions on any actual
measurements made at intermediate times. This is the famous “col-
lapse of the wave function”, on which so much fatuous prose has been
expended. It no more violates conservation of probability than does
throwing out those weather simulations, which predicted that Hurri-
cane Katrina would hit Galveston.
• One may worry that there is a violation of unitarity in this descrip-
tion, because if I apply the same unitary transformation to the states
| ↑〉⊗|Ready〉 and | ↓〉⊗|Ready〉, individually, then I get a pair of states
whose overlap is not small. This seems like a violation of the superpo-
sition principle, but this mathematical exercise has nothing to do with
physics, for at least two reasons. First the macro-states labeled by +/−
are not single states, but huge ensembles, with eN members. The typi-
cal member of any of these ensembles is a time dependent state with the
property that time averages of observables over a short relaxation time
are identical to those in another member of the ensemble. The chances
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of starting with the identical |Ready〉 state or ending with the same
| + /−〉 states in two experiments with different initial micro-states,
is e−N . Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, the experimenter
who designs equipment to amplify microscopic signals into macroscopic
pointer readings, does not control the microscopic interaction between
the atoms in the measuring device and e.g. the electron whose spin is
being measured. Thus, in effect, every time we do a new measurement,
whether with the same input micro-state or a different one, it is virtu-
ally certain that the unitary transformation that is actually performed
on the system is a different one.
For me, these considerations resolve all the angst associated with the
Schro¨dinger’s cat paradox. Figurative superpositions of live and dead cats
occur every day, whenever a macroscopic event is triggered by a micro-event.
We see nothing remarkable about them because quantum mechanics makes
no remarkable predictions about them. It never says “the cat is both alive
and dead”, but rather, “I can’t predict whether the cat is alive or dead,
only the probability that you will find it alive or dead if you do the same
experiment over and over”. Wave function collapse and the associated claims
of instantaneous action at a distance are really nothing but the the familiar
classical procedure of discarding those parts of a probabilistic prediction,
which are disproved by actual experiments. This is usually called the use of
conditional probabilities, and no intellectual discomfort is attached to it.
We are left with the discomfort Einstein expressed in his famous apho-
rism about mythical beings rolling dice. Those of us who routinely think
about the application of quantum mechanics to the entire universe, as in
the apparently successful inflationary prediction of the nature of Cosmic Mi-
crowave Background temperature fluctuations, cannot even find comfort in
the frequentist’s fairy tale about defining probability “objectively” by doing
an infinite number of experiments. Probability is a guess, a bet about the
future. What is it doing in the most precisely defined of sciences? I will leave
this question for each of my readers to ponder in solitude. I certainly don’t
know the answer.
Finally, I want to return to the spread of the wave packet for the center
of mass, and what it means from the point of view presented here. It is clear
that the uncertainties described by this wave function can all be attributed to
the inevitable quantum uncertainties in the initial conditions for the position
and velocity of this variable. Quantum mechanics prevents us from isolating
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the initial phase space point with absolute precision. For free particles or
harmonic potentials, these can simply be viewed (via the Wigner distribu-
tion) as microscopic initial uncertainties in the classical trajectory Xcm(t).
For other potentials there are small corrections to this, proportional to in-
verse powers of N ∼ 1020, since the Wigner distribution no longer satisfies
the classical Liouville equation. If we wait long enough these uncertainties
would, from a purely classical point of view, lead to macroscopic deviations of
the position from that predicted by the classical trajectory we have expanded
around. The correct interpretation of this is that our approximation breaks
down over such long time scales. A better approximation would be to decide
that after a time long enough for an initial microscopic deviation to evolve
into a macroscopic one, we must redefine our super-selection sectors. After
this time, matrix elements between classical trajectories that were originally
part of the same super-selection sector, become so small that we must declare
that they are different sectors.
Thus instead of, in another famous Einsteinian phrase, complaining that
the moon is predicted to disappear when we don’t look at it (over a time scale
power law in its mass), we say that quantum mechanics predicts that our best
measurement of the initial position and velocity of the moon is imprecise.
The initial uncertainties are small, but grow with time, to the extent that
eventually we cannot predict exactly where the moon is. Quantum mechanics
does predict, that the moon has followed some (to a very good approximation)
classical trajectory, but does not allow us to say which one, a long time after
an initial measurement of the position and velocity.
2 Quantum field theory
I will describe the considerations of this section in the language of relativistic
quantum field theory. A fortiori they apply to the non-relativistic limit,
which we discussed in first quantization in the previous section. They also
apply to cutoff field theories, with some kind of spatial cutoff, like a space
lattice. The key property of all these systems is that the degrees of freedom
are labeled by points in a fixed spatial geometry, with a finite number of
canonical bosonic or fermionic variables per point. The Hamiltonian of these
degrees of freedom is a sum of terms, each of which only couples together the
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points within a finite radius3 In the relativistic case of course the Hamiltonian
is an integral of a strictly local Hamiltonian density.
Let us first discuss the ground state of such a system. If the theory has
a mass gap, then the ground state expectation values of products of local
operators fall off exponentially beyond some correlation length Lc. If d is the
spatial dimension of the system,and V is a volume ≫ Ldc , define the state
|φc, V >,
as the normalized state with minimum expectation value of the Hamiltonian,
subject to the constraint that
∫
V
ddx φ(x)/V = Φc.
Let v = V/Ldc . One can show, using the assumption of a finite correlation
length, that these states have the following properties
• The quantum dynamics of the variable Φc is amenable to the semi-
classical approximation, with expansion parameter ∝ 1/v.
• The matrix elements of local operators between states with different
values of φc satisfy
〈Φc, v|φ1(x1) . . . φn(xn)|Φ
′
c, v〉 ∼ e
−cv,
where n is kept finite as v →∞.
• The interference terms in superpositions between states with different
values of Φc remain small for times of order e
bv. This follows from the
previous remark and the fact that the Hamiltonian is an integral of lo-
cal operators. This remark is proved by thinking about which term in
the t-expansion of e−iHt first links together the different superposition
sectors with an amplitude of order 1. There is a technical problem in
this argument, because the Hamiltonian is unbounded, but it is intu-
itively clear that a cutoff at high energy should not affect the infrared
considerations here.
3Various kinds of exponentially rapid falloff are allowed, and would not effect the qual-
itative nature of our results.
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In the language of the previous section, averages of local fields over dis-
tances large compared to the correlation length are good pointer observables.
To define an actual apparatus, we have to assume that the quantum field
theory admits bound states of arbitrarily large size. Typically this might
require us to add chemical potential terms to the Hamiltonian and insist
on macroscopically large expectation values for some conserved charge. The
canonical example would be a large, but finite, volume drop of nuclear matter
in QCD. We can repeat the discussion above for averages over sub-volumes
of the droplet.
Of course, in the real world, the assumption of a microscopically small
correlation length is not valid, because of electromagnetic and gravitational
forces. Indeed, most real measuring devices use these long range forces, both
to stabilize the bound state and for the operation of the machine itself. I do
not know how to provide a mathematical proof, but I am confident that the
properties described above survive without qualitative modification4. This
is probably because all the long range quantum correlations are summarized
by the classical electromagnetic and gravitational interactions between parts
of the system5 . It would be desirable to have a better understanding of the
modification of the arguments given here, which is necessary to incorporate
the effects of electromagnetism and (perturbative) gravitation. One may
also conclude from this discussion that a system at a quantum critical point,
which has long range correlations not attributable to electromagnetism or
gravitation, would make a poor measuring device, and might be the best
candidate for seeing quantum interference between “macroscopic objects”.
Of course, such conformally invariant systems do not have large bound states
which could serve as candidate “macroscopic objects”.
Despite the mention of gravitation in the previous paragraph, the above
remarks do not apply to regimes in which the correct theory of quantum
gravity is necessary for a correct description of nature. We are far from
a complete understanding of a quantum theory of gravity, but this author
believes that it is definitely not a quantum field theory. I will give a neces-
sarily idiosyncratic discussion of quantum gravity in the next section. The
reader who wishes to skip that section will not lose anything essential to his
understanding of the general principles of quantum theory.
4In the intuitive physics sense, not that of mathematical rigor.
5 Recall that the Coulomb and Newtonian forces between localized sources are described
in quantum field theory as quantum phase correlations in the wave function for the multi-
source system.
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3 Towards a quantum theory of gravitation
This is not the place to recapitulate all I have written about the quantum
theory of gravitation. Readers who are interested can consult [1]. Instead,
I will just assert certain differences between my vision of the theory, and
ordinary quantum field theory. In quantum field theory, one assumes a fixed
Lorentzian space-time background, and the algebra of observables describing
the results of measurements in a given causal diamond6, is infinite dimen-
sional and becomes universal as the diamond is taken smaller and smaller.
This is a fancy way of saying that all quantum field theories are scale invariant
at short distance.
The covariant entropy bound [2] is a conjectural bound on the entropy
associated with a causal diamond in the theory of quantum gravity. It says
that the entropy is bounded by one quarter of the area in Planck units, of
the maximal area d − 2 surface on the null boundary of the diamond. This
maximal area surface is called the holographic screen of the causal diamond.
The covariant entropy bound can be “derived” in a semi-classical manner by
assuming a connection between entropy density and energy density. Fischler
and I [4] proposed that this connection between geometry and entropy be
taken as the fundamental constructive principle of quantum gravity. The
only universally defined density matrix for a quantum system, which, like
quantum field theory in a generic space-time, does not necessarily have a
conserved Hamiltonian,is the maximally uncertain one. We thus proposed
that the quantum definition of a causal diamond is a Hilbert space of fixed
size. The causal relations between different diamonds are fixed by specifying
which tensor factors in the algebra of observables in each diamond, should be
identified as operators which can be measured by observers in both diamonds.
We presented a tentative set of axioms for such a quantum space-time [1].
For the present purposes, the most important feature of this formalism
is the (only partially understood) manner in which it reduces to quantum
field theory, and its description of high entropy states which are not ap-
proximated by quantum field theory. Very roughly speaking, the variables
describing physics in a causal diamond can be described by first specifying
the “algebra of functions on the holographic screen”. This is a finite dimen-
sional matrix algebra, with a basis consisting of N elements. When N →∞
6A causal diamond is the intersection of interior of the past light cone of a point P and
the interior of the future light cone of a point Q in the past of P.
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the area of the screen goes to infinity and the algebra converges to the usual
infinite dimensional commutative algebra of functions. A basis element fn of
the algebra is called a pixel. The variables of the quantum theory form an
operator algebra
⊗PA,
where the single pixel algebra A is a finite dimensional operator algebra7.
In less formal language, we pixelate the holographic screen and have an
independent algebra of quantum variables for each pixel.
The quantum variables then are matrices Oji , where for each element i, j,
O is a member of A. The precise algebra of matrices is determined by the
requirement that the sequence of algebras converge to the correct continuum
function algebra as N → ∞. Particles arise in this formalism when, for dy-
namical reasons, the variables associated with a commuting set of matrices,
are approximately dynamically independent of the rest. The usual permuta-
tion gauge symmetry relating commuting matrices to block diagonal matrices
is interpreted as particle statistics. There is a natural way [5] that the ge-
ometry of a holographic screen produces variables describing supersymmetric
particles. As in Matrix Theory [3], the size of individual block matrices is
related to the total momentum of particles in the direction perpendicular to
the holographic screen. We will call this radial momentum. The natural ba-
sis for particle kinematics is to describe each particle by an angular position
on the screen and the momentum perpendicular to the screen. This should
be familiar to experimental particle physicists.
Without going into details, two features of this formalism are noteworthy:
• In a finite causal diamond, the number of particles is bounded, in a
way that depends on their momenta.
• If we try to use all of the variables in a finite causal diamond, we in-
evitably have non-commuting matrices, and we lose the particle inter-
pretation of the Hilbert space. This failure occurs as we try to construct
states which maximize the entropy8. A further assumption of the for-
malism is that the Hamiltonian for these maximal entropy states is a
7This algebra incorporates information about the detailed topology of space-time, and
in particular, compact dimensions.
8As usual, this locution means, ”states which are typical members of the maximal
entropy ensemble”.
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highly degenerate one with a random spectrum. This ensures that our
model reproduces the thermodynamics of black holes.
To make a long and incomplete story short, the aim of this formalism
is to show that the theory of quantum gravity contains states consisting of
multiple particles, under conditions in which the particles do not collapse to
form black holes, as well as black hole states, and nothing else9. The black
hole states have tiny random energy splittings, and behave like an equilibrium
ensemble with only a few macroscopic variables. The particle states are well
described by field theory and, for appropriate choices of field theory10 it
will have macroscopic bound states with many macroscopic moving parts.
These are excellent approximations to the classical measuring devices used
in formulating the axioms of quantum mechanics, as has been shown above.
Black holes are terrible measuring devices, they can only register changes in
a few macroscopic variables, like mass charge and angular momentum.
4 Conclusions
I suspect the material in this paper is well understood by many other physi-
cists, including most of those who have worked on the environmental de-
coherence approach to quantum measurement [6]. If there is anything at
all new in what I have written here about quantum measurement, it lies
in the statement that a macroscopic apparatus of modest size serves as its
own “environment” for the purpose of environmental decoherence. In normal
laboratory circumstances, the apparatus interacts with a much larger envi-
ronment and the huge recurrence and coherence times become even larger.
Nonetheless, there is no reason to suppose that a modestly macroscopic ap-
paratus, surrounded by a huge region of vacuum, with the latter protected
from external penetrating radiation by thousands of meters of lead, would
behave differently over actual experimental time scales, than an identical
piece of machinery in the laboratory.
The essential point in this paper is that the corrections to the classical
behavior of macroscopic systems are exponential in the size of the system in
9I am neglecting the states on the cosmological horizon of an asymptotically de Sitter
space-time, which behave much like black hole states.
10Presumably these choices are somewhat restricted in the quantum theory of grav-
ity, and existing approaches to string theory have shown us some of these restrictions.
However, as of this writing, a wide range appears to be possible.
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microscopic units. This puts observable quantum behavior of these systems in
the realm of Poincare recurrence phenomenon, essentially a realm of science
fiction rather than of real experimental science. When a prediction of a
scientific theory can only be verified by experiments done over times super-
exponentially longer than the measured age of the universe, one should not
be surprised if that prediction is counter-intuitive or “defies ordinary logic”.
Quantum mechanics does make predictions for macro-systems which are
different than those of deterministic classical physics. Any time a macro-
system is put into correlation with a microscopic variable - and this is the
essence of the measurement process - its behavior becomes unpredictable.
However, these predictions are indistinguishable from those of classical sta-
tistical mechanics, with a probability distribution for initial conditions de-
rived from the quantum mechanics of the micro-system. It is only if we try to
interpret this in terms of a classical model of the micro-system that we realize
something truly strange is going on. The predictions of quantum mechanics
for micro-systems are strange, and defy the ordinary rules of logic. But they
do obey a perfectly consistent set of axioms of their own, and we have no
real right to expect the world beyond the direct ken of our senses, which had
no direct effect on the evolution of our brains, to ”make sense” in terms of
the rules which were evolved to help us survive in a world of macroscopic
objects.
Many physicists, with full understanding of all these issues, will still share
Einstein’s unease with an intrinsically probabilistic theory of nature. Prob-
ability is, especially when applied to non-reproducible phenomena like the
universe as a whole, a theory of guessing, and implicitly posits a mind which
is doing the guessing. Yet all of modern science seems to point in the direc-
tion of mind and consciousness being an emergent phenomenon; a property
of large complex systems rather than of the fundamental microscopic laws.
The frequentist approach to probability does not really solve this problem.
Its precise predictions are only for fictional infinite ensembles of experiments.
If, after the millionth toss of a supposedly fair coin has shown us a million
heads, and we ask the frequentist if we’re being cheated, all he can answer is
“probably”. Neither can he give us any better than even odds that the next
coin will come up tails if the coin toss is truly unbiased.
I have no real answer to this unease, other than “That’s life. Get over
it.” For me the beautiful way in which linear algebra generates a new kind of
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probability theory, even if we choose to ignore it and declare it illogical11, is
some solace for being faced with a question to which, perhaps, my intrinsic
makeup prevents me from getting an intuitively satisfying answer. On the
other hand, I believe that discomfort with an intrinsically probabilistic for-
mulation of fundamental laws is the only “mystery” of quantum mechanics.
If someone told me that the fundamental theory of the world was classical
mechanics, with a fixed initial probability distribution, I would feel equally
uncomfortable. The fact that the laws of probability for micro-systems don’t
obey our macroscopic “logic” points only to facts about the forces driving the
evolution of our brains. If we had needed an intuitive understanding of quan-
tum mechanics to obtain an adaptive advantage over frogs, we, or some other
organism, would have developed it. Perhaps we can breed humans who have
such an intuitive understanding by making the right to reproduce contingent
upon obtaining tenure at a physics department. Verifying the truth of this
conjecture would take a long time, but much less than time than it would
take to observe quantum correlations in a superposition of macro-states.
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